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BRCA1/2 GENETIC TEST AND ELASTIC DEMAND 
 
 
ABSTRACT 
Consumer groups fear that the use of genetic testing information in insurance underwriting might 
lead to the creation of an underclass of individuals who cannot obtain insurance; thus, these 
groups want to ban insurance companies from accessing genetic test results.  Insurers contend 
that such a ban might lead to adverse selection that could threaten their financial solvency.  To 
investigate the potential effect of adverse selection in a term life insurance market, a discrete-
time, discrete-state, Markov chain is used to track the evolution of 12 closed cohorts of women, 
differentiated by family history of breast and ovarian cancer and age-at-issue of a 20-year 
annually renewable term life insurance policy.  The insurance demand behavior of these women 
is tracked, incorporating elastic demand for insurance.  During the 20-year period, women may 
get tested for BRCA 1/2 mutations.  Each year, the insurer calculates profits/losses to date and 
expected future benefit payouts which determines the following year’s premium schedule.  At 
the end of each policy year, women can change their life insurance benefit, influenced by their 
testing status and premium changes.  Adverse selection could result from differentiated (i) 
benefits following test results; (ii) lapse rates according to test results; and (iii) reactions to price 
increases.  It is concluded that with realistic estimates of behavioral parameters, adverse 
selection should be a manageable problem for insurers.     
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INTRODUCTION 
 The initial phase of the human genome project was completed in 2000.  Researchers hope 
that the sequencing of the human genome will allow them to develop new drugs and therapies, 
and to identify genetic risk factors for a variety of conditions.  At the same time, many fear that 
the human genome map may open a new frontier for potential discrimination, particularly in 
insurance.  Senators James Jeffords and Tom Daschle stated that “misuse of genetic testing could 
create a new underclass: the genetically less fortunate” (Jeffords and Daschle, 2001).  In many 
countries, an intense legislative and lobbying activity, reminiscent of the debate over access to 
HIV tests in the 1980s, is taking place that could shape the environment of underwriting in life 
and health insurance.  Consumer groups, fearing discrimination and the creation of a class of 
uninsurable individuals, want insurers and employers prevented from gaining access to medical 
information obtained through genetic testing.   
In opposition to these views, insurance companies point to the risk of adverse selection. 
With over 1,100 genetic conditions identified and over 800 genetic tests offered, they fear that 
policyholders may gain a financial advantage through insurance purchase decisions, from genetic 
information known to them but not revealed to insurers.1  Insurers claim that without a level 
playing field a death spiral of increasing premiums and decreasing portfolio size may threaten 
their financial solvency.  They emphasize the positive implications of DNA testing for annuitants 
and the benefits of early diagnosis.  They discuss the ethics and inconsistency of prohibiting the 
use of genetic tests while allowing other medical tests and family history to be used for 
underwriting purposes.  Actuaries in the United States voice their concerns through bodies such 
as the American Academy of Actuaries; by means of Issue Briefs, articles, and Capitol Hill 
                                                 
1 More information about specific genetic conditions and genetic tests can be obtained from the National 
Institutes of Health, National Library of Medicine, www.genetests.org. 
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briefings, Congress is urged to proceed with extreme caution when it considers legislation aimed 
at preventing genetic discrimination for insurance.  
Both sides, consumer groups and the insurance industry, recognize that the predictive 
information obtained from genetic tests could be relevant to the actuarial calculations used by 
insurers in establishing policies and premiums. At issue is whether the use of such information 
by insurers in underwriting is justified on economic and market grounds to overcome social 
concerns.   
The word “discrimination” is often used neutrally by economists to reflect the ability to 
distinguish among groups, but the same word is used by the public to reflect socially unfair ways 
of classifying groups.  In the economic sense, is adverse selection a sufficiently plausible threat 
that discrimination based on genetic test results is justified?  On average, in the US, women live 
longer than men and Caucasian-Americans live longer than African-Americans.  Both of these 
differences in life expectancy could be used to establish lower term life insurance premiums for 
women and Caucasian-Americans compared to men and African-Americans.  Insurance 
companies typically charge lower premiums for women than for men, but they do not charge 
lower premiums for Caucasian-Americans than for African-Americans.  This is not because 
discrimination by sex is actuarially more important than discrimination by race, but because 
discrimination by race is not socially tolerated.  To that end, the use of race as an underwriting 
factor for insurance is prohibited in all states.  In Montana alone, the use of gender in rating for 
any type of insurance is illegal.  If in these cases, failure to discriminate by race or gender led to 
sufficient adverse selection - for example, if the protected groups overpurchased life insurance as 
a result, raising premiums to a level that drove the other groups from the market - the balance 
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between socially intolerable discrimination and actuarially fair discrimination might shift in the 
other direction. 
In the debate about whether insurers should be allowed to use genetic testing results in 
underwriting, the actuarial profession can contribute by designing models to analyze adverse 
selection and quantify its impact, thereby generating a more informed discussion.  Several recent 
articles have been published, estimating the potential impact of the test for a BRCA1/2 mutation 
on the term insurance and critical illness markets, and of the test for specific alleles of the ApoE 
gene that may predispose one to Alzheimer’s Disease on long-term care insurance (Subramanian 
et al, 1999; MacDonald and Pritchard, 2000, 2001; MacDonald et al, 2003).  These models all 
rely on the assumption of inelastic demand.  Those articles model insurance purchase behavior 
following a genetic test, but do not account for the fact that policyholders may elect to reduce 
their coverage following the price increases resulting from adverse selection.  This research 
introduces elastic demand for term insurance into the analysis.  A discrete-state, discrete-time, 
Markov chain is used to follow the evolution of twelve cohorts of women, differentiated by age 
at issue and family history of breast and ovarian cancer.  All women own term insurance at time 
0.  Policyholders can get tested for BRCA1/2 mutations and, after receiving the test results, 
either change their face amount or lapse their policy.  The adverse selection that results forces 
insurance carriers to raise premium levels.  Marshall’s Law of Demand, resulting in a constant 
price elasticity of demand, models the reaction of policyholders when confronted with premium 
increases. 
The paper proceeds as follows.  First, current regulatory and underwriting procedures in 
various countries are discussed, to illustrate the diversity of country response to insurer use of 
genetic tests results.  The elastic demand Markov model is described next and the estimation 
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procedure for all parameters is described.  Results and sensitivity analyses are then presented, 
followed by our concluding remarks.   
 
CURRENT REGULATORY CONDITIONS 
Insurance companies are concerned about being restricted from access to genetic tests 
taken by their potential and current customers.  The questions that regulation needs to address 
are: 
(i) Should insurers be permitted to reflect in their rates the information provided by genetic 
tests? 
(ii) Should insurers be permitted to require applicants to disclose the results of genetic tests 
taken prior to the application for insurance? 
(iii) Should insurers be permitted to require applicants to take genetic tests prior to 
consideration of the application? 
Regulatory authorities also need to provide a definition of “genetic information” and 
“genetic test.” A genetic test can be defined in a narrow way as a chemical test involving 
examination of the constitution of a gene or chromosome, or in a much larger way that would 
include examination of family history. 
The answers to these questions have led to four major types of laws, which can be 
classified as follows (Berberich and Fischer, 1999; Bartram et al, 2000; Regenauer, 2000; 
Breyer, 2001; Doble, 2001).  Under a Laissez Faire approach, insurers have full freedom to 
request new tests and the disclosure of existing tests, and to incorporate test results in 
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underwriting and rating.2  This is practiced in Australia, Canada, Japan, Ireland, Portugal and 
Spain.  Through Disclosure Duty, applicants have to disclose the results of existing tests, at the 
insurer’s request, but cannot be required to take additional tests; this approach is used in 
Germany, New Zealand and the UK.  By Consent Law,  applicants are not required to divulge 
genetic tests results.  If they do, insurers may use this information; this approach exists in the 
Netherlands and Switzerland.  In Austria, Belgium, Denmark, France, Italy, and Norway, under 
Strict Prohibition, insurers cannot request genetic tests, cannot require applicants to provide 
existing tests results, and cannot use any genetic information in underwriting and rating. 
In the absence of (or in addition to) legislation, three approaches have been used by 
insurers’ associations.  Through a Voluntary Agreement, the Swedish Insurance Federation and 
the state have agreed that no genetic tests can be made a condition for issuance or modification 
of a life insurance policy.  In addition, the results of tests taken prior to the application will not 
be considered in the risk assessment, unless the sum insured exceeds 15 times an inflation-
adjusted base amount ($62,000 in 1999).  In Germany, Finland, Greece, the Netherlands, 
Switzerland, and the UK, insurers have adopted a voluntary Moratorium on the use of genetic 
tests.  The moratorium may apply to all life insurance policies (Germany) or to all policies with a 
sum insured under a given limit (Netherlands, UK).  Finally, in Australia and South Africa, 
insurers’ associations have put together Guidelines or a Code of Conduct.  The Life, Investment 
and Superannuation Association of Australia passed a position paper “Genetic Testing and Life 
Insurance” that was accepted as an underwriting guide in 1997.  These guidelines specify that 
insurers (i) will not initiate any genetic test; (ii) may request that existing test results be made 
                                                 
2 Legislative activity concerning the regulation of genetics in insurance is proceeding at such a fast pace 
that some of the information in this introduction may have become obsolete by the time this article is 
published. 
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available for risk classification; (iii) will not use tests as a basis for preferred underwriting; and 
(iv) will not use test results in the assessment of relatives of the tested individual.  In a May 2003 
report, the Australian Law Reform commission recommended that the insurance industry should 
be required to adopt a range of improved consumer protection policies with respect of the use of 
genetic information (including family history) for underwriting purposes.  New laws and 
guidelines should ensure that genetic information is only used in an actuarially sound matters, 
that industry education about genetics is improved, and that complaints-handling processes are 
extended to cover underwriting decisions. 
 In the UK, the Association of British Insurers introduced a Code of Practice on Genetics 
in 1997, which enforced a ban on insurers asking anyone to take a genetic test (Daykin et al, 
2003).  Results from seven specific tests, approved by a genetics advisor, must be disclosed and 
can be taken into account.3  Genetic test outcomes cannot be used to underwrite another member 
of the family.  More importantly, a moratorium was imposed on the use of genetic tests for life 
insurance policies with a sum insured not exceeding £100,000 sold in connection with a 
mortgage.  In the UK, mortgage-based life insurance is common and considerably reduces the 
potential for adverse selection, since the sum insured is limited to the price of the house; over-
insurance is unlikely.   
In 1997, the British government set up a Genetics and Insurance Committee charged with 
assessing requests from insurers to be allowed to use specific genetic tests for specific policies.  
The Committee ruled that a test could be approved if medical and actuarial evidence 
demonstrates that a positive test result implies an extra mortality exceeding 50% or an extra 
                                                 
3 The seven tests are for the following conditions: Huntington’s disease, hereditary breast cancer, familial 
adenomatous polyposis, myotonic dystrophy, early-onset Alzheimer’s disease, multiple endocrine 
neoplasia, and hereditary motor and sensory neuropathy. 
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morbidity exceeding 25%.  In 2000, the Committee approved the Huntington’s disease test for 
policies not covered by the existing moratorium.   
In 2001, a major British insurer was forced to admit that it had been using unapproved 
tests in underwriting, in violation of the code of conduct (Kite, February 8, 2001).  Following 
this disclosure, the House of Commons Science and Technology Select Committee issued a 
report strongly critical of the industry, concluding that self-regulation by insurers is not working, 
and that some companies are trying to set up a “genetic ghetto.”  The Human Genetics 
Commission recommended that the government place a moratorium on the use of genetic test 
results.  During that moratorium, the Commission would investigate the use of family history in 
underwriting.  In October 2001, the insurance industry and the government reached an agreement 
on a five-year moratorium on access to genetic test results for all life insurances policies with a 
sum insured not exceeding £500,000, with no link to mortgages.  During the moratorium, the 
government and insurance industry will fund research by independent experts on the use of 
family history and explore risk pooling so that those with adverse genetic test results will be able 
to access affordable insurance post-moratorium.  In such an arrangement, policyholders would be 
insured by the risk pool and companies would share in the pool’s experience.  At the 2002 UK 
Forum for Genetics and Insurance, some insurance companies, mentioning the poor experience 
of the diabetes pool, expressed their belief that risk pooling may not be a viable idea due to high 
administrative costs.   
 In the United States, Wisconsin became in 1991 the first state to pass a law barring 
insurers from using existing genetic test information and requesting new tests from health 
insurance applicants.  Other states have followed suit, periodically revising their laws to adapt to 
advances in genetic testing.  A vast majority of states now prohibits the use of genetic test results 
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for health insurance risk classification and pricing.  Far fewer states have regulated life 
insurance.  In Missouri and Minnesota, insurers may not require individuals to take a genetic test, 
may not base rates on any test result and may not refuse to insure based on genetic traits. In 
Florida and North Carolina, no insurer may refuse to issue a life policy because the insured 
person has the sickle-cell trait.  Several states require informed consent before submitting to a 
genetic test, and confidentiality of results.  In many of these states, insurers also cannot request 
genetic information from family members.  Interestingly, several states have laws whereby 
insurers may not use genetic test results “unless the applicant’s medical history and condition 
and claims experience or actuarial projections establish that substantial differences in claims are 
likely to result from the genetic condition.”  This provision would allow insurers to invest in and 
use medical studies to calculate the mortality risks associated with a particular test and justify its 
use for future premium determination.  At the federal level, Congress is currently debating the 
“Genetic Nondiscrimination in Health Insurance and Employment Act” (HR 602/S 318).  This 
bill places restrictions on insurers, banning the use of genetic information in underwriting health 
insurance; it does not however address the use of genetic testing results in life insurance 
underwriting.   
 
DESCRIPTION OF MODEL 
 To model the degree of potential adverse selection to an insurer, a discrete-state, discrete-
time, Markov chain is used to track the insurance purchase and genetic testing behavior of 
different cohorts of women over a 20-year period.  At time 0, 1,000 healthy women of the same 
age, untested for BRCA1/2 gene mutation, are insured for an amount of $100,000 under an 
annually renewable term insurance policy, with the premium paid at the beginning of each year 
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and benefit paid at the end of the year of death.  Three ages at time 0 are considered: 30, 40, and 
50, along with four different family histories: no family history (No FH) of breast (BC) or 
ovarian (OC) cancer, one first-degree relative (a mother or a sister) with onset of BC between the 
ages of 20 and 30 (1FDR-BC), two first-degree relatives with onset of BC between 20 and 30 
(2FDR-BC), and one first-degree relative with OC (1FDR-OC).  This leads to a total of 12 
cohorts.  These cohorts are closed: there are no new entrants into the group after time 0.    
 The adoption of a discrete-time Markov chain rather than a continuous-time model 
reflects the belief that insurance decisions are usually taken at the end of the policy year, just 
before renewal.  Policyholders rarely cancel a policy in the middle of the year; rather, they lapse 
after receiving the renewal invoice.  Policyholders with an elastic demand for insurance react to 
price increases when they learn about them through the renewal notice. 
 Each year, the initial cohort reduces through the combined effect of three decrements: 
policy lapse, death, and test for BRCA1/2 mutations.  Lapses take place at the end of the year 
and are final: once her policy has lapsed, a woman does not reenter the cohort later on.  Deaths 
and tests take place during the year; a uniform distribution of decrements in each year of age is 
assumed both for deaths and tests, to model the competing interaction between these two 
decrements.  Within a particular policy year, women who undergo a BRCA test receive the result 
(positive or negative).  As the test for the BRCA is believed to be very accurate, with sensitivity 
and specificity exceeding 99%, testing errors (false positives and false negatives) are not 
considered (Myriad Genetic Laboratories, 2003).  Tested women then constitute their own sub-
cohort, from which lapses and deaths occur over the remainder of the 20-year period.  The 
insurer is not allowed to learn about any genetic testing results. 
At the end of each policy year, all women make their insurance decision for the following 
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year: they can change their benefit amount or let the policy lapse.  This decision is influenced by 
their testing status/outcome and the prices faced for insurance.  When all decisions are taken, an 
adverse selection process may begin to develop at the expense of the insurer.  Three factors 
contribute to this process: 
(i) Differentiated lapsing rates: women testing positive are expected to lapse at a lower rate 
than untested women; women testing negative may exhibit a higher lapsing rate. 
(ii) Differentiated benefits: women testing positive are more likely to increase their benefit; 
women testing negative may reduce their benefit.  It is assumed that women may increase 
their benefit without having to provide medical evidence of insurability.  
(iii) Women who test positive may be more likely to accept a premium increase than women 
who are untested or who test negative.  Facing an increase, they may decrease their 
benefits less than others. 
The insurer, being prevented from accessing genetic test results, does not know which of 
its insureds has tested and, more importantly, who has tested positive.  A combination of the 
factors listed above may lead to total observed death benefits being higher than expected since 
the insurer prices these women corresponding to their family history.  Consequently, the 
company must raise premiums for the following year.  Not knowing who among the 
policyholders have tested, the company must continue to price all contracts using family history 
and thus must increase the premiums in each cohort by the same percentage.  Since insurers have 
access to family history information, each of the twelve cohorts is assumed to constitute a 
separate rating cell; price increases are calculated for each cell separately.   
In practice, insurers may follow a variety of pricing strategies: they may simply react to 
adverse mortality experience by attempting to recoup their losses or they may try to anticipate 
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future mortality trends by developing an actuarial model to forecast future losses.  Such a model 
could incorporate the downward time trend in mortality rates, adverse selection increase factors, 
behavioral reactions of policyholders to price increases, changes in the demographic composition 
of the portfolio, and anticipated investment experience. The retroactive pricing approach is 
considered here because it maximizes the adverse selection effect.  It is assumed that, each year, 
the insurer calculates its cumulative losses since time 0.  These losses are spread among the 
remaining customers of the rating cell through a uniform premium increase per benefit dollar.  
The company does not recoup every single lost dollar, as policyholders continue to modify their 
insurance purchase behavior through lapses and benefit changes.  The company is always one 
step behind; it changes its premiums based on past customer behavior, but does not anticipate the 
fact that this behavior constantly changes as a result of pricing decisions. 
Elastic demand is incorporated into the consumers’ demand system.  Behavioral changes 
in benefits as a result of price increases is modeled using Marshall’s Law of Demand, linking the 
price P of an economic good to its quantity sold Q through the relationship: 
 AQP =λ  (1) 
where A is a constant.  Parameter λ is the (constant) price elasticity of demand: 
 
PdP
QdQ
/
/
−=λ  (2) 
At the end of a policy year, a woman who remains untested reacts to an annual premium change 
according to the price elasticity untestedλ , determining her insurance benefit for the next policy 
year.   
For a woman who gets tested during policy year t, the insurance benefit demanded for 
year t+1 is solely influenced by this test result.  For each test outcome, the relative degree of 
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change in the woman’s known death risk depends on the information known to her prior to 
testing, specifically her family history.  This relative change in risk level then influences the 
quantity of insurance demanded.  This (constant) risk elasticity of demand with respect to health 
risk, δ , is defined as  
 
RdR
QdQ
/
/
=δ  (3) 
where R denotes the woman’s family history health risk – her 20-year probability of death given 
her family history of BC or OC.  )(+δ  denotes the risk elasticity after the shock of a positive test 
that doubles the death risk, while )(−δ  denotes the risk elasticity after a negative test that halves 
the death risk.   
The insurance benefit demanded in year t+2 and each year after will be determined using 
Marshall’s law of demand with a price elasticity parameter corresponding to the woman’s test 
status, positiveλ  or negativeλ .  Thus, three different price elasticities of demand are estimated for 
the model, with the relationship negativeuntestedpositive λλλ << , reflecting the expected level of 
responsiveness to benefit changes.  Summarizing, a woman who tests positive in year 5 modifies 
her insurance benefit according to a price elasticity untestedλ   at times 1 to 4, a risk elasticity )(+δ  
at time 5, and a price elasticity positiveλ  at times 6 to 19 (unless she decides to lapse at some 
intermediate time).  In our model, if a woman gets tested in year t, the insurance decision made 
for year t+1 is influenced only by her risk elasticity corresponding to the test result; the amount 
of insurance benefit demanded in t+1 is not simultaneously affected by her price elasticity of 
demand.  We use this as each woman’s decision-making approach; a recently obtained result of a 
genetic test overwhelmingly affects the woman’s thoughts and subsequent insurance strategy 
thus any premium change for year t+1 would be accepted in full. 
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Each year, premiums increase because of (i) increased mortality due to age, and (ii) 
adverse selection.  To identify the increase due to adverse selection alone, it is assumed that 
policyholders do not reduce their benefits in response to the portion of the price increase due to 
normal mortality changes.  Sensitivity analyses will be performed on the various parameter 
estimates to investigate the variability of our results. 
 
PARAMETER ESTIMATION 
 The model requires the estimation of many parameters.  Annual probabilities of death for 
the different ages at issue, family histories, and test results are required to set premiums and 
determine expected and observed benefit payouts.  These death probabilities were obtained in 
Lemaire et al (2000).  Probabilities to test positive according to family history (0.40 for women 
with 2 FDR with BC, 0.15 with 1 FDR with BC, 0.08 with 1 FDR with OC, 0.005 with no family 
history) were derived in Subramanian et al (1999).  These estimates are based upon initial 
findings of relatively high penetrance for BRCA1/2 mutations among linkage families.  
Although it was believed in the late 1990s that these estimates may be inflated by the selection of 
highly penetrant families for inclusion in linkage analysis, the most recent evidence suggests that 
the risk of breast and ovarian cancer associated with BRCA1/2 mutations is not much lower in 
the population as compared to just high-risk families (Berg, 2002; Brose et al, 2002; Antoniou, 
2003).  Given the controversy that surrounds the exact BRCA1/2 risk, we chose to base our 
analyses on early, slightly higher, estimates, as this conservative approach assumes the greatest 
impact of testing on cancer risk and will provide the highest estimate of adverse selection.  An 
annual effective rate of 5% is used for discounting.  The annual testing rate is set at a 
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conservatively high 5%.  While currently a very small proportion of women are getting tested, 
this situation could change if the cost of the test substantially drops from the current $2,760.   
Price and risk elasticities were estimated by means of a questionnaire completed by 48 
individuals working in the health care industry, 18 males and 30 females.  Respondents were 
sorted into three age groups: under 36, 36-45, above 45. Each was asked 15 life insurance 
coverage questions, as illustrated in the Appendix.  In each question, 10 possible life insurance 
amounts were presented, ranging from no coverage to $1,500,000.  A premium for each amount 
was given.  On the first question, respondents were asked how much insurance they would buy 
given their current health level and benchmark premiums obtained from a leading insurer.  As 
expected, older individuals selected higher benefit amounts.  The average benefit was $200,400 
in the “under 36” age group, $446,667 in the “36-45” group, and $523,077 in the “over 45” 
group.  Males selected much higher benefits than females: $433,889 v. $274,000, for an overall 
average of $333,958.  In the next four questions, respondents were asked to select benefit 
amounts under different pricing scenarios, holding their mortality risk level constant.  The 
premiums for the different insurance benefit amounts were varied from one-half to two and a 
half times benchmark premiums.  These first five questions measured respondents’ price 
sensitivity of demand for term life insurance, holding mortality risk constant.  Answers to these 
questions were used to estimate .untestedλ  
In questions 6 to 10, a hypothetical situation was presented in which respondents were 
told their risk of death had doubled after the result of a special blood test.  In question 6, the 
same set of possible life insurance benefit amounts and premiums was offered as in question 1, at 
these benchmark premiums; respondents were asked to choose their desired benefit amount 
given this higher death risk level.  In the next four questions, premium schedules were varied in 
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the same way as in questions 2 to 5; these questions were used to estimate positiveλ , the price 
elasticity of demand for term insurance under the high death risk scenario.  Questions 11 to 15, 
used to estimate ,negativeλ  followed the same format, but represented a situation in which the 
death risk was halved after the blood test.  Respondents exhibited a high degree of inertia in the 
presence of a test result that halves the death risk; 71.25% did not change their benefit, with little 
variation across gender.  The average benefit change was not significantly different from 0.  This 
emphasizes that, for most people, term insurance is an essential purchase driven by family need; 
the amount of insurance purchased is fairly independent of the mortality risk and the annual 
premium.  Respondents reacted more to a doubling of the death risk; in this situation, only 
48.33% did not change their benefits (61.11% of males v. 40.67% of females).  The average 
benefit increase was a highly significant $145,600.  Males increased their benefit by an average 
$115,000, females by an average $164,000.   
First, the price elasticity coefficient for untested women untestedλ was estimated through a 
stacked cross-section regression analysis performed on all questionnaire responses to questions 1 
through 5.  The regression used the percentage change in benefit as the dependent variable and 
the percentage change in premium as the exogenous price variable.  For each individual, four 
observations were recorded, the changes in selected benefit from question 1 to questions 2 to 5 
respectively.  Maximum likelihood estimation with an error components error structure was used 
to allow for correlation across observations drawn from the same individual.  Regression 
equations were of the form 
 %(∆  Benefit) = λ %(∆  Premium) + β (Control Variables) + µ (4) 
where the error term included a fixed effect for each individual and independent and identically 
distributed error terms.  Dummy variables for demographic characteristics, such as age, sex, and 
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income of the respondents, were included in the regression. The overall price elasticity 
coefficient λ was estimated at 0.6579; this estimate was robust across all categories of 
respondents and insensitive to changes in age, gender, education level, income, or marital status.  
Pauly et al (2003) also estimate the price elasticity of demand for annually renewable 
term life insurance, using two sets of data: the January 1997 data set sold by CompuLife that 
contains firm-level premium data for term contracts from all major companies in the US market, 
and the 1997 US Buyer’s Study sold by LIMRA International that consists of a random sample 
of policies bought by the customers of over 35 life insurance companies.  Their regression 
analyses suggest that the price elasticity of demand for annually renewable term insurance ranges 
from 0.3 to 0.5, depending on the dataset and the control variables used. 
Table 1 compares annually renewable term insurance to common goods and services in 
terms of price elasticities.  It shows that consumers consider term insurance to be an important 
good in their lives.  It is more inelastic than everyday use goods such as shoes and kitchen 
appliances and only slightly more elastic than tobacco, a product that is not only highly 
addictive, but in addition shows little substitution effect across brands. 
[ Table 1 about here ] 
 
 A similar regression analysis on all fifteen questions, using death risk level dummies to 
allow price elasticity to change across risk scenarios, provided estimates of the three price 
elasticities ,, untestedpositive λλ  and negativeλ , that are not significantly different.  Although there 
is some evidence that average benefit levels change across risk scenarios, the data do not support 
the hypothesis that negativeuntestedpositive λλλ << .  Thus, in our benchmark model, both positiveλ  
and negativeλ  are set equal to 0.6579. 
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To obtain estimates for the risk elasticity of demand, attention was focused on an 
individual’s responses to questions 1 and 6, which used the same premium pricing schedule.  
Question 1 asked the respondent to indicate the desired level of benefit given current death risk; 
in question 6, the death risk was hypothesized to be doubled.  For each respondent, a risk 
elasticity of demand was determined by calculating the percentage change in benefit given this 
doubling of health risk in the question; these individual elasticities were then averaged across all 
respondents to determine )(+δ . An estimate for )(−δ  was calculated in a similar manner, using 
responses to questions 1 and 11. )(+δ and )(−δ  were estimated at 0.9851 and 0.1279, 
respectively. 
As stated above, the estimate for )(+δ  was obtained assuming a death risk increase of 
100%.  The results of a positive test for BRCA1/2 mutations do not exactly result in the death 
risk being doubled.  Rather, the degree of change in known health risk depends upon the 
woman’s family history and age.  Table 2 presents the change in mortality risk following a 
genetic test, for the 12 cohorts of women.  These probabilities were derived in Lemaire et al 
(2000).  They show that, for instance, a 30-year old woman with 2FDR-BC who tests positive 
experiences a 56.1% increase in death risk. A linearity assumption was used to 
interpolate/extrapolate the risk elasticity parameters for women in each cohort, both for positive 
and negative tests. 
 [ Table 2 about here ] 
  
Lapse rates that are differentiated according to test results are introduced.  LIMRA (1996) 
reports average lapse rates for annually renewable term insurance policies of 15% during policy 
year 1, 14.8% during year 2, 12.4% during years 3-5, 9.4% during years 6-10, and 6.5% during 
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years 11+.  These lapse rates do not vary much by age at issue.  With these rates, out of one 
thousand issued policies, only 151.75 remain in force after 20 years.  To correspond with this 
figure, for untested women, a constant lapse rate of 13.4% is adopted in our model for years 1-5; 
a rate of 7.5% is used for years 6-20.  These rates lead to the same total number of lapses as the 
LIMRA rates.  From the questionnaire, it is observed that no respondents selected a $0 benefit, 
thus lapsing, after learning of a positive or negative test result.  This can be interpreted, for this 
sample, as the initial purchase of insurance serving to fulfill a basic financial need rather than a 
hedge against future dramatic changes in health.  However, one of the primary adverse selection 
concerns is that women who test negative for a mutation are more likely to lapse their insurance 
policy than women who test positive.  Following this, as a conservative approach, lapse rates for 
our benchmark model are set at 2% for women who test positive; for women who test negative, 
the lapse rate is set at 9.5%. 
 
RESULTS 
For each of the twelve cohorts, premiums collected and benefits paid year by year were 
tracked and term insurance benefits were changed according to elasticity parameters.  The model 
is first run using the parameters estimates listed above.  As  the model conveys, the change in 
benefits in response to a BRCA test result widely varies across cohorts, as the significance of a 
test result depends on family history.  For women age 30 at the beginning of year 1 with no 
family history of BC or OC, the prior probability of having the BRCA mutation is only 0.5%; a 
negative test hardly carries any information, while a positive test brings disastrous news and a 
huge shock.  Consequently, the selected benefit -if the test is taken in year 1- only decreases by 
0.12% if the test turns out to be negative, and increases by 173.07% for a positive result.  For 
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women age 30 in the 2FDR-BC cohort, the probability of a gene mutation is 40%.  The outcome 
of the test conveys significant information, either way.  Women testing positive increase their 
benefit by 55.26%, women testing negative decrease their benefit by 5.61%, the highest figure 
among all cohorts.  For other family histories, benefit increases following a positive test range 
between 33.87% (2FDR-BC, age 50) and 173.07% (No FH, 30), corresponding to the amount of 
information revealed by a positive test.  Benefit decreases following a negative test range 
between 0.05% (no FH, age 50) and 5.61% (2FDR-BC, age 30). 
Table 3 summarizes the evolution of the cohort of women age 30 at the beginning of year 
1, whose family history is 2FDR-BC.  Beginning at time 2 and continuing thereafter, the insurer 
increases premiums, reacting to the aggregate effect of women getting tested and changing their 
insurance benefit, untested women who reduce their insurance benefit because of price increases, 
and women who lapse.  Annual and cumulative premium increases are depicted in Figure 1.  
After 20 years, the cumulative premium increase, which we also interpret as cumulated adverse 
selection, reaches 29.28%.  The degree of information provided by the BRCA test for this family 
history renders this case as one of the worst possible scenarios for potential adverse selection; 
however, with our benchmark parameter estimates, there is clearly no “adverse selection death 
spiral”.  After seven years of escalating premium increases, the adverse selection process tapers 
off, as the portfolio runs out of insured women available to be tested.  After 20 years, 798 
policies have lapsed, 20 policyholders have died, and only 51 women remain insured and 
untested.   
[ Table 3 about here]  
[ Figure 1 about here]  
 
 20
 
 
 
 
 For other cohorts, cumulated adverse selection ranges from ranges from 0.62% (no FH, 
age 50) to 40.44% (1FDR-BC, age 30).  The 12 cohorts are then pooled into a single portfolio in 
which each cohort of age and family history is weighted by its respective likelihood in the 
population.  These weights were determined using observed age-at-issue of term insurance 
policies obtained from LIMRA, and probabilities for given family histories derived from fertility 
rates published the National Center for Health Statistics (2000).  The evolution of premium 
increases for the portfolio are tracked; these increases are also reported in Table 3.  It is observed 
that the overall cumulative premium increase due to adverse selection reaches only 4.23%. This 
is a very modest figure.  Despite uncertainties in the estimation of all parameters, it appears very 
likely that adverse selection in term life insurance following a ban on the use of the BRCA 
genetic test should not be a major source of concern to insurers. 
 To examine the degree of potential adverse selection due to genetic testing for BRCA1/2 
mutations, the sensitivity of our results to the behavioral assumptions was then explored.  The 
results presented here for the sensitivity analysis explore the 2FDR-BC, age 30 case, one that has 
so far exhibited a high degree of adverse selection.  Recall that the benchmark value of the main 
elasticity parameter, untestedλ , was estimated at 0.6579 and because estimates of positiveλ  and 
negativeλ  were not found to be significantly different from untestedλ , the values for these two 
parameters were also set at 0.6579.  The values for all three parameters are varied from 0.30 to 
1.00 and the 20-year cumulative premium increases were then calculated.  Keeping all other 
assumptions constant, we find remarkably that cumulated adverse selection is quite insensitive to 
changes in price elasticities; it remains at approximately 29.3% in the 2FDR-BC, age 30, case. 
Next, keeping untestedλ  at the benchmark 0.6579, the range between positiveλ  and negativeλ  
was expanded by setting these price elasticities equal to 0.00 and 1.00, respectively.  Thus, under 
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this scenario, women at a higher than average risk do not reduce their insurance benefit in the 
face of price increases while women at a lower than average risk are completely responsive to 
price changes.  We found that the adverse selection cost here is 31.70%. 
 We then kept all price elasticities at their initial levels and varied the two risk elasticities 
of demand.  These two parameters )(+δ and )(−δ  convey the level of benefit change after a test 
which results in doubling or halving the death risk; the initial estimates for these parameters were 
0.9851 and 0.1279.  )(+δ  was varied from 0.50 to 1.00; )(−δ  from 0.00 to 0.50.  In Figure 2, the 
gradual increase in cumulated adverse selection is depicted in the 2 FDR-BC age 30 case; the 
cumulative premium increase approaches 32.19% in the most extreme case.     
[ Figure 2 about here ] 
 
 To examine the incremental effect of lapsing, all lapse rates were kept at their benchmark 
levels;  all price and risk elasticities were set at zero.  In this scenario, women do not change 
their insurance benefits year to year; they either remain at $100,000 throughout their insured life 
or lapse their policies.  It was observed that adverse selection from lapsing forces the insurer to 
institute a 18.07% premium increase over 20 years.  We then return the price and risk elasticities 
to their benchmark values and set only the two lapse rates after testing to be zero.  Thus, the 
lapse rates for untested women remain at the rates estimated from the LIMRA data.  So, in this 
scenario, regardless of whether a woman tests positive or negative, she does not lapse her policy 
for the rest of the time period.  We find that the 20-year adverse selection cost, which would be 
solely due to price and risk elasticities of demand, is 11.33%.  Then, these lapse rates after 
testing are gradually increased.  It is observed that the greater the disparity between the lapse rate 
after a positive test and lapse rate after a negative test, the greater the adverse selection costs.   
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 Our model introduces three sources for adverse selection: differentiated benefits 
following test results, differentiated lapse rates after testing, and different reactions to price 
increases.  Focusing on the 2 FDR-BC, age 30, case, one of the cohorts that has the highest 
potential for adverse selection, at our benchmark parameter estimates, we calculated cumulated 
adverse selection costs to be 29.28% after 20 years.  The impact of differentiated lapsing rates 
was estimated at 18.07% while the impact of price and risk elasticities was found to be 11.33%.    
Given that differentiated reactions following premium increases were found to be negligible, we 
conclude that adverse selection costs come mainly from benefit changes following the shock of a 
test, and to varying lapsing rates after testing.  The price elasticity of demand has a minimal 
impact on adverse selection costs.   
 
DISCUSSION 
 In our analysis, performed with conservative behavioral assumptions, we found that 
potential adverse selection due to BRCA1/2 testing should not result in a significant cost to term 
life insurers, as our point estimate of the cumulative effect of adverse selection after 20 years 
only amounted to 4.23%. This cost is likely to be offset by the overall decrease in mortality rates, 
and the decline in breast and ovarian cancer mortality due to better prevention, detection and 
treatment techniques.  
 Many other genetic tests are now available.  Among the most common are tests for 
familial adenomatous polyposis, myotonic dystrophy, early-onset Alzheimer’s disease, multiple 
endocrine neoplasia, and hereditary motor and sensory neuropathy.  Probabilities to develop the 
disease after a positive test are generally smaller than with BRCA1/2 mutations; thus their 
impact on life expectancy is likely to be smaller.  Consequently, a similar model, specifically 
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developed for other genetic diseases, will surely lead to smaller estimates of the cost of adverse 
selection. 
We conclude that as long as current testing conditions prevail (few highly predictive 
genetic tests available, low testing rate due to high cost), adverse selection due to genetic testing 
could be a manageable problem for insurance companies.  This conclusion is valid only in the 
term life insurance market; models to study the impact of genetic testing and adverse selection in 
health and long term care insurance, which require different inputs on morbidity and treatment, 
are currently being developed. 
These conclusions could change if advances in genetics lead to the development of an 
inexpensive test that would simultaneously investigate many common genetic diseases.  The 
availability of such a test may be several years away, which provides some time for actuarial 
research to further investigate the consequences of new tests.  In the presence of huge 
uncertainties concerning the future of genetic testing, a limited-time moratorium on the use of 
genetic tests by insurers, a policy implemented in many European countries, could make sense.   
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Appendix 
Survey Questionnaire 
 After answering questions concerning employment, gender, marital status, years of 
education completed, number of people depending on their financial support, and annual 
household income, respondents were requested to imagine that they currently have no personal 
life insurance, through their employer or otherwise, and that they are contemplating purchasing a 
10-year term life policy for themselves.  After explanations about the policy, respondents had in 
question 1 to select one benefit amount and annual premium, given their current health 
conditions.  For the 36-45 age group, premium and benefits are provided in Table 4.  In 
subsequent questions, premiums and health conditions were varied, keeping the same benefit 
levels. 
Table 4 
Question 1, age group 36-45 
Given your current health and the basic 
premiums listed below, how much personal life 
insurance would you buy? 
Annual Premium Benefit Amount 
No purchase 0 
$160 $100,000 
$250 $200,000 
$340 $300,000 
$430 $400,000 
$520 $500,000 
$610 $600,000 
$745 $750,000 
$970 $1,000,000 
$1,420 $1,500,000 
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Table 1 
Short-run Price Elasticity of Demand of Several Goods 
 
GOOD ELASTICITY 
Electricity 0.13 
Rental housing 0.18 
Water 0.20 
Telephone 0.26 
Eyeglasses 0.37 
Jewelry and watches 0.41 
Tobacco products 0.46 
Term Insurance 0.66 
Kitchen appliances 0.67 
Movie tickets 0.87 
Shoes 0.91 
Shoe cleaning and repair 1.31 
China, glassware, tableware 1.54 
Restaurant meals 2.27 
 Source: Houthaker & Taylor (1970) and this research 
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Table 2 
Increase or Decrease of Death Risk following the Outcome of BRCA1/2 Testing 
 
 
AGE TEST NO FH 1FDR-BC 2FDR-BC 1FDR-OC 
30 Positive +175.7% +119.2% +56.1% +141.2% 
40 Positive +150.8% +113.8% +64.0% +122.4% 
50 Positive   +68.7%   +56.2% +34.4%  +56.6% 
30 Negative      -0.9%    -21.2%  -43.9%  -13.3% 
40 Negative      -0.8%   -15.4%  -35.1%  -12.0% 
50 Negative      -0.4%    -7.8%  -20.7%    -7.5% 
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Table 3 
Cost of Adverse Selection. Age 30 at Time 0.  
 2FDR-BC Cohort  Entire Portfolio 
 
 
Year 
t 
 
 
Premiums    
Collected 
 
 
Benefits 
Paid 
 
Necessary  
% increase in 
Year t+1 
 
Cumulative  
% increase by 
Year t+1 
  
Necessary  
% increase in 
Year t+1 
 
Cumulative  
% increase by 
Year t+1 
1 
  
72,753.53  
  
76,391.21  0.0000 0.0000 
 
0.0000 0.0000 
2 
  
72,189.43  
  
76,013.04  0.2982 0.2982 
 
0.0550 0.0550 
3 
  
72,610.20  
  
76,815.27  0.7883 1.0889 
 
0.1419 0.1973 
4 
  
73,774.40  
  
78,357.47  1.2006 2.3025 
 
0.2103 0.4094 
5 
  
75,464.41  
  
80,411.34  1.5344 3.8723 
 
0.2643 0.6782 
6 
  
77,529.53  
  
82,814.59  1.7145 5.6532 
 
0.2906 0.9765 
7 
  
83,236.97  
  
88,869.05  1.6713 7.4189 
 
0.2742 1.2607 
8 
  
89,072.01  
  
95,135.38  1.7153 9.2615 
 
0.2768 1.5501 
9 
  
94,994.19  
  
101,468.18  1.7285 11.1500 
 
0.2729 1.8378 
10 
  
100,938.77  
  
107,801.72  1.7189 13.0606 
 
0.2654 2.1198 
11 
  
106,851.24  
  
114,081.59  1.6935 14.9753 
 
0.2557 2.3937 
12 
  
112,685.97  
  
120,262.16  1.6571 16.8806 
 
0.2450 2.6580 
13 
  
118,404.73  
  
126,305.12  1.6130 18.7659 
 
0.2340 2.9120 
14 
  
123,975.41  
  
132,178.18  1.5636 20.6230 
 
0.2231 3.1558 
15 
  
129,370.84  
  
137,854.07  1.5105 22.4450 
 
0.2128 3.3895 
16 
  
134,567.93  
  
143,309.60  1.4549 24.2265 
 
0.2031 3.6137 
17 
  
139,546.83  
  
148,524.90  1.3977 25.9628 
 
0.1940 3.8289 
18 
  
144,290.33  
  
153,482.84  1.3395 27.6500 
 
0.1857 4.0356 
19 
  
148,783.28  
  
158,168.43  1.2808 29.2849 
 
0.1781 4.2346 
20 
  
153,012.27  
  
162,568.46  
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Figure 1 
Annual and Cumulative % Premium Increases, 2FDR-BC, age 30 
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Figure 2 
Cumulative % Premium Increases, 2FDR-BC, age 30.  Varying Risk Elasticities of Demand 
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